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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of the United States is a revered national document 
outlining the confines of government and the relationship among the created 
structures.1 In constitutional law classes, common broad topics include the 
Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause, and discussion of fundamental rights. 
Little discussed, however, is the Intellectual Property Clause. In Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8, Congress is granted the enumerated power “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”2 Just three years after the Constitution was signed, Congress 
passed the Patent Act of 1790.3 Since then, Congress has passed several acts 
that significantly update patent legislation, including: the Patent Act of 1793, 
the Patent Act of 1836, the Patent Act of 1952, and the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (AIA) of 2011.4 
The AIA changed the procedures by which patents are reexamined for 
invalidity on request of the inventor or challenged by third-party competitors. 
These changes caused frustration for companies with significant patent 
portfolios, as they encountered new—and unexpected—assertions of patent 
invalidity through use of the process called inter partes review (IPR).5 As a 
result, sections of the AIA are being challenged on numerous grounds, many of 
which are constitutionally based.6 The most recent constitutional challenge 
asserts that applying the IPR process, enacted in the AIA, to pre-AIA granted 
patents constitutes a violation of the Takings Clause based on companies’ 
investment-backed expectations.7 At the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, the judges were unpersuaded and the claim failed in Celgene v. Peter.8 
The Federal Circuit used its Celgene holding in at least two subsequent cases 
alleging a Takings Clause claim: Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. and 
Collabo Innovations, Inc. v. Sony Corp.9 Industry commentary suggests that the 
 
 1 See generally U.S. CONST.  
 2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3 Patent Act of 1790, ch.7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).  
 4 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Patent Act of 1952, ch.1, §1, 66 Stat. 792 
(1952); Patent Act of 1836, ch.357, §6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836); Patent Act of 1793, ch.11, §1, 1 
Stat. 318 (repealed 1836).  
 5 See Neal Solomon, IPRs Unduly Harm Patent Holders and Benefit Big Tech 
Infringers, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/24/ 
iprs-unduly-harm-patent-holders-benefit-big-tech-infringers/id=89568/ [https://perma 
.cc/6MFQ-F4XU].  
 6 See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 
(2018). 
 7 Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 8 Id. at 1362. 
 9 Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 935 F.3d 1319, 1331−32 (Fed. Cir. 2019); 
Collabo Innovations, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 778 F. App’x 954, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Court 
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Takings Clause, as it relates to pre-AIA application of IPR, is ripe for 
consideration at the Supreme Court of the United States.10 In recent history, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to patent cases from the Federal Circuit that it 
intended to reverse or reverse-in-part to clarify patent law and related doctrine.11 
But, what should the question be before the Supreme Court? The justices could 
consider the question that was before the Federal Circuit: Is applying the AIA 
IPR process retroactively to a pre-AIA issued patent a governmental taking in 
violation of the Constitution? Alternatively though, and maybe more 
appropriately, should the question be about the scope of the takings doctrine? 
Traditionally, the Takings Clause is a very conservative doctrine that conforms 
best with an originalist view of constitutional interpretation, with tangible 
property as its primary focus. However, intellectual property sits in the realm of 
intangible property rights. Therefore, should the Takings Clause doctrine 
expand under a living constitutionalist lens to encompass a progressive area of 
law?  
This Note explores the new IPR process enacted in the AIA for reviewing 
pre-AIA issued patents, the Takings Clause as it relates to the specialized 
Federal Circuit, and applicable constitutional theory. Part II discusses the 
America Invents Act inter partes review process, and a recent Supreme Court 
case—Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp. (Oil States)—
reviewing the overall constitutionality of IPR. Part III reviews recent Federal 
Circuit opinions discussing the Takings Clause issue, refreshes the doctrine of 
the Takings Clause, and posits that the Takings Clause, conservatively applied, 
may not be in the best interest of intellectual property law. Part IV considers 
applicable writings and thoughts on takings constitutional theory in regard to 
wealth preservation, how it may apply to the patents, and why this leads to a 
new vision of the Takings Clause. Part V explains why the abandonment of 
originalism is prudent when evaluating instances in which a patent may be 
 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has “nationwide jurisdiction in a variety of subject areas, 
including international trade, government contracts, patents, trademarks, certain money 
claims against the United States government, federal personnel, veterans’ benefits, and 
public safety officers’ benefits claims.” Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/XM8M-R9NU].  
 10 Matthew Rizzolo & Kathryn Thornton, Next Steps After Celgene: Federal Circuit 
Ruling on Takings Clause and IPRs Leaves Open Questions, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/08/07/next-steps-celgene-federal-circuit-ruling-takings-
clause-iprs-leaves-open-questions/id=111961/ [https://perma.cc/JY2F-WZ8X].  
 11 Steven Seidenberg, Tug-of-War over Interpretations of Patent Law Continues 
Between Federal Circuit and SCOTUS, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal 
.com/magazine/article/tug_of_war_over_interpretations_of_patent_law_continues_betwe
en_federal [https://perma.cc/S9HR-483J] (“Historically, the Supreme Court paid little 
attention to patent law. That changed in 2005, when it began reviewing an unprecedented 
number of the Federal Circuit’s patent law decisions. The court heard 27 patent cases over 
the next 10 years, and in 22 of them the justices overturned the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of the law.”).  
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unconstitutionally taken by the government without just compensation, and, 
thus, demands a more progressive interpretation. Part VI concludes.  
II. WHAT IS THE TAKINGS CLAUSE DOCTRINE AND WHY DO IPRS 
MATTER? 
When thinking about intellectual property on a broad level, constitutional 
issues are not always inherently obvious. However, the Intellectual Property 
Clause in the Constitution gives Congress the explicit power to promote the 
progress of science.12 Congress has delegated much of this power to the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), an agency tasked with 
“advis[ing] the president of the United States, the secretary of commerce, and 
U.S. government agencies on intellectual property (IP) policy, protection, and 
enforcement; and promot[ing] the stronger and more effective IP protection 
around the world.”13 As a result of this typical governmental structure, with the 
added complexity of a specialized Federal Circuit, constitutional issues actually 
arise fairly often. Most recently, the issue surrounds the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (AIA), the Takings Clause, and retroactive application of the IPR 
process by the USPTO to patents that were issued prior to the AIA’s passage.  
A. Brief Explanation of IPR under the AIA 
The process of inter partes review was enacted under the America Invents 
Act of 2011.14 Under Chapter 31 of Title 35 of the United States Code, 
procedures were changed for how third parties petition the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB).15 The validity of an issued patent may be challenged 
 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 13 About Us, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/YH24-VZFF] (last updated Oct. 8, 2019). Additionally, the USPTO 
“furthers effective IP protection for U.S. innovators and entrepreneurs worldwide by 
working with other agencies to secure strong IP provisions in free trade and other 
international agreements.” Id. “It also provides training, education, and capacity building 
programs designed to foster respect for IP and encourage the development of strong IP 
enforcement regimes by U.S. trading partners.” Id. 
 14 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 15 35 U.S.C. §§ 311−19 (2012).  
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through reexamination on the basis of 35 U.S.C. Section 10216 or Section 103.17 
The only prior art allowed to be used in the challenge are patents or printed 
publications for first-inventor-to-file patents.18 The effective date for the statute 
enabling IPRs was September 16, 2012, and states applicability “to any patent 
issued before, on, or after September 16, 2012.”19 
B. Is IPR Unconstitutional as Applied to All Patents that Fall under the 
AIA? The Supreme Court Says “No” in Oil States 
The first constitutional challenges to the IPR process, heard by the Supreme 
Court, were in Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group under 
Article III and the Seventh Amendment.20 In 2005, Oil States Energy Services 
was assigned U.S. Patent No. 6,179,053 (’053 Patent) Lockdown Mechanism 
for Well Tools Requiring Fixed-Point Packoff, which “relates to equipment for 
servicing oil and gas wells and, in particular, to an apparatus and method for 
securing a mandrel of a well tool in an operative position in which the mandrel 
is packed-off against a fixed-point in the well.”21 The patent explains that to 
harvest hydrocarbon oil and gas from the ground, stimulation is necessary, often 
 
 16 Id. § 102(a) (“Novelty; Prior Art.—A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(1) 
the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on 
sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention; or (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, 
or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which 
the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively 
filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”). 
 17 Id. § 103 (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding 
that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed 
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. 
Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.”). 
 18 Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review [https://perma 
.cc/RZ7E-BCCQ] (last updated May 9, 2017). The USPTO asserts that “[t]hese deadlines 
do not apply to first-to-invent patents.” Id. A petition for inter partes review cannot be filed 
until after the later of either: (i) 9 months after the grant of a patent or (ii) the date of 
termination of any post-grant review of the patent. Id.  
 19 Id.  
 20 Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (2018). The 
Supreme Court quickly dismissed the Seventh Amendment claim: “[W]hen Congress 
properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, ‘the Seventh 
Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury 
factfinder.’ No party challenges or attempts to distinguish those precedents. Thus, our 
rejection of Oil States’ Article III challenge also resolves its Seventh Amendment challenge. 
Because inter partes review is a matter that Congress can properly assign to the PTO, a jury 
is not necessary in these proceedings.” Id. at 1379 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 
492 U.S. 33, 53–54 (1989) (internal citations omitted)). 
 21 U.S. Patent No. 6,179,053 (filed Aug. 12, 1999). 
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in the form of pumping corrosive and abrasive fluids under high pressure, that 
can degrade fracking equipment.22 The invention purports to improve upon the 
prevention of such damage through their innovative wellhead isolation tools.23 
In 2014, Oil States initiated litigation against Greene’s Energy Group for 
infringement of the ’053 Patent in federal court.24 Greene’s Energy filed and 
won a retaliatory petition before the PTAB challenging the ’053 Patent in an 
IPR.25 When Oil States appealed to the Federal Circuit, it raised the Article III 
unconstitutionality claim, which was the primary basis of the Supreme Court’s 
discussion regarding IPR constitutionality.26 Fundamentally, Oil States argued 
that the IPR process is unconstitutional because it is an Article III adjudicative 
proceeding held by the PTAB that is eerily analogous to judicial power and, as 
such, should be tried before an Article III judge appointed by the President.27  
In holding that the AIA’s IPR procedures are constitutional, Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion rests on the idea that granting patents falls under the 
public rights doctrine, specifically that a patent is the grant of a public franchise 
“arising between the government and others.”28 As a result, patents need not be 
adjudicated under Article III because “granting patents is one of ‘the 
constitutional functions’ that can be carried out by ‘the executive or legislative 
departments’ without ‘judicial determination.’”29 Leveraging this reasoning 
against the IPR process, the majority held that IPRs also fall under the public 
rights doctrine.30 An IPR is a subsequent review of an administrative agency’s 
issuance of a patent, and the PTAB reconsiders the statutory requirements it did 
during the patent application examination that lead to the initial issuance of a 
patent.31 While Justice Thomas concedes that the primary difference between 
granting a patent and an IPR is the time at which the review occurs, he dismisses 
this distinction because patents are granted subject to the qualifications that the 
USPTO has “‘the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent claim’ 
in an inter partes review. Patents thus remain ‘subject to [the Board’s] authority’ 
to cancel outside of an Article III court.”32  
 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Oil States Energy Servs. v. Trojan Wellhead Prot., Inc., No. 6:12-cv-611, 2014 WL 
12360946 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2014).  
 25 Greene’s Energy Grp. v. Oil States Energy Servs., No. IPR2014-00216, 2015 WL 
2089371, at *1 (P.T.A.B. May 1, 2015). 
 26 Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372−73, 1379 
(2018).  
 27 See id. at 1378. 
 28 Id. at 1373 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).  
 29 Id. at 1374 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50−51 (1932)).  
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. at 1374 (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)); 35 
U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).  
 32 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (first quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137; and then 
quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50). 
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In its review, the Supreme Court explicitly left open other constitutional 
questions for possible consideration in the future: “[O]ur decision should not be 
misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due 
Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”33 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS BUILDING PRECEDENT ON RETROACTIVE 
APPLICATION OF IPR, BUT IS ITS REASONING IN ALIGNMENT WITH 
TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE? 
In 2019, the Federal Circuit held that when patents issued prior to the 
passage of the AIA are invalidated through use of the AIA IPR process, an 
unconstitutional taking does not occur.34 Particularly, in Celgene, the plaintiff 
“advance[d] a regulatory takings theory and argue[d] that subjecting its pre-AIA 
patents to IPR—a procedure that existed at the time its patents issued, but with 
several differences—unfairly interferes with its reasonable investment-backed 
expectations without just compensation.”35 
A. The Federal Circuit’s Celgene v. Peter Analysis of the Takings 
Clause Is Not Based on Takings Clause Precedent 
Celgene’s argument is based in regulatory takings doctrine and alleges that 
the invalidation of its patent interferes with its reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, without just compensation.36 The brief for Celgene focuses on 
differences between the pre-AIA procedures for inter partes reexamination 
 
 33 Id. at 1379 (first citing Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999); and then citing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 
(1882)). 
 34 Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 935 F.3d 1319, 1331−32 (Fed. Cir. 2019) 
(citing Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1357−63); Collabo Innovations, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 778 F. 
App’x 954, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1357−63); Celgene Corp. v. 
Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1357−63 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Court of Federal Claims also heard a 
case on patent takings. Christy, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 641, 657−60 (2019). 
However, Christy, Inc. v. United States is ripe for reversal as its discussion is based on lack 
of property rights in a patent sufficient to constitute a taking:  
In short, patents are public franchises, not private property. Because ‘[a] taking 
compensable under the Fifth Amendment inherently requires the existence of ‘private 
property,’ patent rights are not cognizable property interests for Takings Clause 
purposes. In any event, patent owners have no property right to maintain patent claims 
that are found to be unpatentable, regardless of the timing of any such determination. 
Id. at 660 (quoting Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (internal citations omitted)).  
 35 Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1358.  
 36 Id. 
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procedures and the AIA inter partes review procedures.37 Specifically, Celgene 
argues that the new IPR process resembles civil litigation due to the challenger’s 
ability to conduct discovery and “join issue in briefing and at an oral hearing.”38 
Moreover, the process is conducted without the presumption of validity that is 
afforded in the civil litigation process resulting in an IPR procedure that favors 
the challenger now more than ever.39 These differences, according to Celgene, 
amount to an unconstitutional taking and diminished the total value of its 
invention.40 Celgene “invested time and money showing that thalidomide, in 
combination with dexamethasone, is effective in treating patients recently 
diagnosed with multiple myeloma, and it incurred massive expenses to meet the 
FDA’s onerous and costly requirements for new drug applications” and 
continued to invest research and development to that effect.41 Finally, Celgene 
tried to undermine the Federal Circuit’s precedent, Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 
by attacking the basis on which it was decided, because the standard used was 
whether the statute was enacted in an arbitrary or irrational way.42 According to 
the appellant, the Supreme Court has since abrogated that reasoning, which 
resulted in the arbitrary or irrational standard standing as the incorrect test to 
use in analyzing a taking.43 
While arguing against Celgene on two different theories supporting the 
constitutionality of IPR, the USPTO did not discuss Celgene’s claims relating 
to its investment-backed expectations in cultivating its patent portfolio:  
[First,] when the Board finds claims unpatentable in an IPR, it does not 
effectuate a taking under the Fifth Amendment because the patent owner 
“never had a valid property right because the patent was erroneously issued in 
the first instance.” Second, the PTO argues that Celgene’s takings claim fails 
“because patents have been subject to reconsideration and cancellation by the 
USPTO in administrative proceedings for nearly four decades, and Celgene’s 
own patent[s were] issued subject to this administrative revocation 
authority.”44 
According to the appellant’s reply brief, the USPTO also relied on Landgraf 
v. USI Film Products for the proposition that retroactively applied procedures 
 
 37 See generally Brief of Appellant, Celgene v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019) 
(No. 2018-1167), 2018 WL 2554044. 
 38 Id. at 55. 
 39 See id.  
 40 Id. at 52 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992)). 
 41 Id. at 57.  
 42 Id. at 58 (citing Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  
 43 Brief of Appellant, supra note 37, at 58–59. 
 44 Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal citations 
omitted) (discussing intervenor’s brief). 
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are not in violation of the presumption against retroactivity, because a lesser 
reliance interest exists in procedures.45 
After summarizing each of the parties’ briefs, the Federal Circuit 
constructed a two-factor test to determine whether an unconstitutional taking 
occurred: “[1] the effect that doing so has on the patent right granted by the 
PTO, and [2] specifically whether IPRs differ from the pre-AIA review 
mechanisms significantly enough, substantively or procedurally, to effectuate a 
taking.”46 The court rejected Celgene’s argument by reasoning that patents have 
always been challengeable in federal courts and that the examination methods 
of the pre-AIA statutes are substantially similar to the IPR procedures.47 In 
support, the court states that both third parties or the Director of the USPTO 
have been able to petition for patent reexamination for almost forty years.48 
When Celgene filed its patent applications at issue in the case, either ex partes 
examination or inter partes reexamination existed.49 The Federal Circuit 
concluded that the inter partes review procedures did not differ significantly 
enough from avenues of consideration in existence at the time of the patent 
application filing.50 Relying on the similarities, the court offers that many more 
similarities exist than the differences relied on by Celgene, such as burden of 
proof and discretion of the Director to initiate proceedings. Lastly, the court 
looked to congressional intent upon AIA enactment also for support: “The [IPR] 
proceeding involves what used to be called a reexamination. . . . Although 
Congress changed the name from “reexamination” to “review,” nothing 
convinces us that, in doing so, Congress wanted to change its basic purposes, 
namely, to reexamine an earlier agency decision.”51  
Unsurprisingly, the Federal Circuit did not shy away from the many 
distinctions among IPRs and its predecessors, but that does not affect the 
calculus of the Federal Circuit’s opinion. Chief Judge Prost’s opinion concedes 
that differences do exist because otherwise there would have been no real need 
for a new patent act.52 Further, in addressing Celgene’s attempt to distinguish 
 
 45 Reply Brief of Appellant at 33, Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2019) (No. 2018-1167), 2018 WL 5801172, at *27; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 
511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 46 Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1358. The Federal Circuit relies on its own precedent reviewing 
ex parte reexamination under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and Due Process Clause. 
Id. at 1358 n.13 (citing Patlex, 758 F.2d at 603, 605). 
 47 Id. at 1359. 
 48 Id. (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016)). 
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. at 1360.  
 51 Id. (citing Cuozzo, 236 S. Ct. at 2144). 
 52 Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1361 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40 (2011)) 
(“Congress passed the AIA with post grant review procedures that were intentionally more 
robust and would provide a ‘more efficient system for challenging patents that should not 
have issued.’”). The Federal Circuit further mitigates its concession by likening IPRs to 
increasing staff and budget at the USPTO:  
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IPRs from civil litigation, the court was persuaded that those distinguishing 
characteristics are markers of the reexamination process of the pre-AIA 
system.53 The court relies on precedent that indicates “no one has a vested right 
in any given mode of procedure” and did not alter patent owner expectations 
that reconsideration of their patent—either before or after the AIA—was 
possible.54 
B. In Both Collabo Innovations, Inc. v. Sony Corp. and Arthrex, Inc. v. 
Smith & Nephew, Inc., the Federal Circuit Did Not Elaborate on Its 
Decision in Celgene 
The Federal Circuit heard two cases asserting takings claims in 2019. Judge 
Stoll wrote both opinions for the court and largely reiterated its stance in 
Celgene without adding much dicta or reasoning. In Arthrex, the panel 
concluded that the patent in question was issued on September 2, 2014, over 
two years after the passage of the AIA.55 Alternatively however, if the patent 
had issued prior to the passage of the AIA, the panel confirmed the basis for its 
reasoning in Celgene that insufficient differences exist between the pre-AIA 
processes to challenge patents as a third party and the IPR process created in the 
AIA.56 The court stated that Arthrex unequivocally had notice that the USPTO, 
using a preponderance of evidence standard, can reconsider the validty of issued 
patents on particular grounds.57 Likewise in Collabo Innovations, the “patent 
owners already expected that their patents could be challenged in district court 
and ‘[f]or forty years’ had expected that ‘the [Patent Office] could reconsider 
the validity of issued patents on particular grounds, applying a preponderance 
of the evidence standard.’”58 
The Federal Circuit has not yet elected to hear any particular case en banc, 
and the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari. However, there is reason to 
believe that not all judges on the Federal Circuit may agree with the reasoning 
in Celgene. In Judge O’Malley’s concurring opinion published January 24, 2018 
 
Implementing IPRs to create a more robust and efficient system for challenging the 
validity of patents is not unlike the PTO or Congress making the system more robust 
by, for example, increasing the budget for or number of examiners in the reexamination 
unit. While those changes might result in significantly more requests for reexamination 
and more claims being canceled, we doubt that anyone would argue that they effectuate 
a taking.  
Id. at 1361 n.18. 
 53 Id. at 1362. 
 54 Id. at 1361–62 (quoting Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 
387 U.S. 556, 563 (1967)). 
 55 Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 935 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 56 Id. (citing Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1357–63). 
 57 Id. at 1331−32 (citing Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1357–63). 
 58 Collabo Innovations, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 778 F. App’x 954, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2019) 
(quoting Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1363). 
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in a separate Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew opinion relating to the same patent, she 
expressed caution at the USPTO’s ability to retroactively apply provisions of 
the AIA: “I also am skeptical that the framework of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act . . . provides the Board with the necessary authority to issue adverse 
judgments based on statutory disclaimers prior to institution of inter partes 
review.”59 In this particular lawsuit however, the questions were not reached 
because Arthrex disclaimed any such claim before the Federal Circuit.60 
C. Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Takings Clause 
The Supreme Court has treated patents as property as it relates to the 
Takings Clause.61 The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that “private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”62 
Therefore, if a patent is taken for public use, after a reasonable expectation and 
reliance interest by the patent owner without just compensation, a taking has 
occurred. Due to the assertion that retroactive application of the AIA is in 
violation of the Takings Clause, doctrine relating to regulatory takings are 
applicable.  
The Supreme Court of the United States has an elaborate history with a 
multitude of precedents outlining the confines of the Takings Clause, with three 
cases dominating regulatory takings jurisprudence—Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council,63 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,64 and 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.65—although in a rather 
ununified fashion.66 
Lucas and Loretto consider per se regulatory takings with two very different 
focuses: trespass and economics. In Loretto, the government must provide just 
compensation for cases in which the government permanently and physically 
invades one’s property.67 Alternatively in Lucas, the government must provide 
just compensation if the government “deprive[s] an owner of ‘all economically 
 
 59 Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(O’Malley, J., concurring).  
 60 Id.  
 61 See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (quoting James v. 
Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)) (“[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive 
property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government 
itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without 
compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser.”); Oil States Energy 
Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018) (first citing Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999); and then 
citing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)).  
 62 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 63 See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  
 64 See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 65 See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).  
 66 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).  
 67 Id. at 538. 
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beneficial use’ of her property.”68 In the absence of a per se taking, Penn Central 
governs the remainder of cases in the realm of regulatory takings.69 The 
Supreme Court summarized the Penn Central factors for evaluating regulatory 
taking claims as such:  
[A]mong those factors are ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with 
distinct investment-backed expectations.’ In addition, the ‘character of the 
governmental action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion 
or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good’—may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has occurred.70 
While each case reflects on different aspects of a rather amorphously 
applied and complex doctrine, the Supreme Court has deduced a central theme 
amongst the leading regulatory takings cases: “Each aims to identify regulatory 
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which 
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his 
domain.”71 
D. In Following Its Own Precedent in Celgene, the Federal Circuit 
Failed to Cite Supreme Court Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine 
The Federal Circuit often hears cases asserting violations of the Takings 
Clause because of its special jurisdiction over “certain money claims against the 
United States government.”72 In a case involving a land development dispute, 
the Federal Circuit discussed regulatory takings, accepted Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City73 as controlling, and provided the relevant 
analysis: “[T]he regulatory takings analysis is an ‘essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiry,’ which requires courts to evaluate (1) the character of the governmental 
action, (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and (3) the 
extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations.”74 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit stated, “If the court 
determines that the regulation ‘goes too far’ such that it should be recognized as 
a taking of private property for public use, then the government must provide 
just compensation.”75  
 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. at 539.  
 70 Id. at 538–39 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
124 (1978) (internal citations omitted)).  
 71 Id. at 539.  
 72 Court Jurisdiction, supra note 9. 
 73 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 104. 
 74 Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124).  
 75 Id. (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).  
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The Supreme Court should clarify the application of the Takings Clause in 
cases involving the retroactive invalidation of pre-AIA issued patents using the 
AIA IPR process by granting certiorari, or the Federal Circuit should grant a 
rehearing en banc. Two potential scenarios exist. The first scenario is that the 
Supreme Court applies the current takings doctrine to cases like Celgene. The 
second scenario involves the Court creating a new test for intangible property, 
such as intellectual property, which is supported by analysis of originalist and 
living constitutionalist theories. 
If the Supreme Court decides the existing regulatory takings doctrine stands 
with the Penn Central factors, the most important factors to consider when 
evaluating the retroactive invalidation of pre-AIA issued patents using the AIA 
IPR process are the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and the 
extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations. But, how exactly would this be accomplished? The nature of 
patent law is that patents cannot squarely or sufficiently meet any of the other 
Penn Central factors (or be a per se regulatory taking for that matter). A patent 
is “‘the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling’ 
the invention in the United States or ‘importing’ the invention into the United 
States. What is granted is not the right to make, use, offer for sale, sell or import 
[the invention] . . . .”76 When a patent is invalidated, the invention is available 
for use by anyone in the public, including the entity or person that owned the 
patent rights, provided another’s patent did not exclude the making of their own 
invention. As a result, and notwithstanding that patents are property and 
potentially subject to a regulatory taking, the IPR process does not sufficiently 
diminish economic value. In the event that a pre-AIA patent is invalidated 
through IPR proceedings, the patent owner whose rights are void may still make, 
use, offer for sale, sell, or import the invention to secure economic benefit. 
Furthermore, if the patent claimed a successful and profitable invention, it is 
likely that the producing entity would invest in such a technology to their own 
benefit with or without a patent, with the expectation that it would be profitable.  
Reaching the same result as the Federal Circuit—that applying AIA IPR to 
pre-AIA issued patents does not constitute an unconstitutional taking—is a 
coincidental aspect to the Takings Clause analysis, which may suggest that 
granting certiorari or rehearing en banc is not necessary. However, the negative 
implications of refusing to grant certiorari or a rehearing en banc are apparent. 
As other district and appellate courts hear cases asserting a taking in similar 
scenarios, “bad law” may be applied. The fact is that the Federal Circuit devised 
the applied test in Celgene from their own precedent and ignored quintessential 
Takings Clause doctrine from the Supreme Court. But, maybe the Federal 
Circuit was onto something? 
 
 76 General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents 
[https://perma.cc/DNU8-6DJ8] (last updated Nov. 1, 2019) (emphasis added).  
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IV. NOTWITHSTANDING APPLICATION OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE, 
FINDING PRE-AIA PATENTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER AIA IPRS 
CREATES TOO GREAT AN ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN 
The Supreme Court could find that retroactive application of IPR to pre-
AIA issued patents is an unconstitutional taking through the traditional Loretto, 
Lucas, or Penn Central analyses, but doing so would not be plausible because 
of the gross administrative burden that would result. Of the 6700 AIA petitions 
filed as of March 2017, IPRs comprised 92% of the petitions.77 Of the patents 
exiting the IPR process, only 19% emerged with all patent claims intact, while 
81% had some or all claims invalidated.78 The USPTO itself concedes that IPR 
retroactivity is a growing business: “[G]iven the growing number of 
retroactivity challenges apparently prompted by the reference to retroactivity in 
Oil States, . . . this Court may nevertheless conclude that the interests of justice 
warrant addressing the retroactivity question quickly to avert further uncertainty 
regarding the constitutionality of inter partes review.”79 But to offer “just 
compensation” for each pre-AIA claim invalidated would create an 
administrative burden that would be difficult to meet.  
Just compensation in the context of the Takings Clause is “the fair market 
value of its property [and] is thus consistent with the basic equitable principles 
of fairness underlying the Just Compensation Clause.”80 The Supreme Court has 
held that determining fair market value is an arduous task for patents: “A patent 
is a thing unique. There can be no contemporaneous sales to express the market 
value of an invention that derives from its novelty its patentable quality.”81 As 
such, the court must make an effort to “determin[e] the correct . . . value of the 
patented invention, [especially] when it is but one part or feature among many, 
and ascertaining what the parties would have agreed to in the context of a patent 
license negotiation.”82 An added complication is that parties may have 
differences in opinion about the fair market value of an invention, but the parties 
will often agree that the figure is around its “true ‘economic value.’”83 Such 
disagreements are “the inherent risk in licensing intangible assets that may have 
no established market value.”84 Moreover, “even when the patented invention 
is a small component of a much larger commercial product, awarding a 
 
 77 Mark Magas, Note, Consequences for Patent Owners If a Patent Is 
Unconstitutionally Invalidated by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
79, 79−80 (2019). 
 78 Id.  
 79 Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  
 80 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Monroe & Pike 
Ctys., Pa., 441 U.S. 506, 517 (1979) (citing United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 81 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 697 (1933). 
 82 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id.  
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reasonable royalty based on either sale price or number of units sold can be 
economically justified.”85 
But why would the prospect of estimating just compensation of taken 
patents enter into the Federal Circuit’s, or even the Supreme Court’s calculus? 
The answer may rest in the evolving conceptions of the Takings Clause in 
relation to society,86 specifically that property is a form of wealth in the 
contemporary United States. As a result, the Takings Clause is now less about 
protection of property and more about the protection of wealth.87 Applying this 
concept to Celgene and the Federal Circuit’s resulting opinion, compensating 
patent owners for governmentally “taken” patent rights would be an effort to 
protect the wealth of the patent owner. But, with a lack of reliable methodology 
to estimate fair market value for possibly hundreds of patents, holding that pre-
AIA patents and patent claims invalidated by AIA IPR is not practical for the 
Federal Circuit. 
An additional dimension to consider is the deference the judiciary provides 
the legislature with regard to which aspect of political justice is at stake.88 
Economic rights concerning the Takings Clause are highly deferential. In fact, 
“only an extremity of governmental behavior or consequence will dislodge the 
pervasive willingness to accept as equitable the economic burdens imposed by 
governmental action.”89 The conception of patents as an affirmative right of 
“wealth” suggests that patents are outside the realm of the narrowed 
constitutional adjudication because “the prospect of complex questions of social 
strategy and responsibility that succeeds in providing a case for such 
narrowing.”90 Patents as an unconstitutional taking “provides good reason for 
limiting judicial enforcement of constitutional justice along the . . . boundary 
 
 85 Id. at 1339.  
 86 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE 
BASIC QUESTIONS 26 (2007) (discussing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 
(1977)) (“Dworkin seems to claim that one can be faithful to an unchanging text while 
supporting changes in interpretations of that text. And what justifies this claim is perhaps the 
best-known distinction of his legal philosophy: the distinction between constitutional 
concepts and competing conceptions of those concepts.”) (emphases omitted). 
 87 Lawrence G. Sager, Property Rights and the Constitution, 22 PROPERTY 376, 380 
(1980) (“[T]he question becomes whether our constitutional tradition can be understood as 
protecting a state of affairs pursuant to which individuals are for the most part unfettered in 
the pursuit of wealth by the means of their choosing, and further, for the most part able to 
retain the fruits of their acquisitive efforts. On the face of the matter, our constitutional 
tradition seems more promising here. While quite ill suited to the protection of property, the 
compensation requirement seems nicely tailored for the protection of wealth; its effect, after 
all, is to frustrate the redistributions of wealth that would inevitably be the consequence of 
uncompensated governmental takings of property.”).  
 88 See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of 
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 412 (1993). 
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. at 428. 
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beyond which lie economic rights, rights to the repair of injustice, and 
affirmative rights more generally.”91 
If the Federal Circuit considered invalidated patents via retroactive 
application of IPR to pre-AIA patents as an unconstitutional taking, the court 
would have been altering the level of deference typically afforded in cases of 
economic rights and broadening judicial enforcement in an inappropriate 
manner. The resulting administrative burden of providing patent owners just 
compensation after Celgene would congest the USPTO, judiciary, or legislature, 
and ultimately result in governmental stagnation.  
These concepts are vastly complex. Constitutional scholars who have spent 
years ruminating about these very concepts have not reached a perfect solution. 
The Federal Circuit may have realized something preeminently by applying an 
atypical Takings Clause test to regulatory takings. As the Takings Clause 
doctrine stands, the fit to intellectual property, as intangible property, is lacking. 
Therefore, courts may need a fresh perspective on the takings doctrine when 
applying the doctrine to intellectual property. 
V. PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS: ABANDONMENT 
OF ORIGINALISM IN FAVOR OF LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM FOR 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES  
Like many concepts within the Constitution that can be traced back to the 
Magna Carta, the Takings Clause has a history on which the Framers could have 
relied, but that history was sparse.92 The colonial government often made a habit 
of interfering with private property, but such a habit was not accompanied by 
just compensation.93 The idea of just compensation was not included in the 
Magna Carta, however, and the recourse afforded to those whose property was 
seized was procedural.94 In 1777, Vermont was the first state to incorporate 
compensation into its Constitution, and the same notion was included in the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.95 Unfortunately, though, there are no records of 
any discussion relating to the meaning of the Takings Clause by Congress upon 
passage of the Fifth Amendment, and “Madison’s statements thus provide 
unusually significant evidence about what the clause was originally understood 
to mean.”96 But regardless of where one looks for the original meaning of the 
Takings Clause, it is seemingly evident that the Framers intended the Clause for 
when the government physically took property.97  
 
 91 See id. 
 92 See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785–87 (1995). 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 790–91.  
 96 Id. at 791.  
 97 Id. at 795, 798, 831 n.252.  
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But in 1922, the Takings Clause was expanded in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon to include regulatory takings.98 Some commentators allege that after 
Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court has completely disregarded the original 
meaning of the text.99 This expansion was largely due to the changing 
conceptions of property in society and definition of wealth as “stocks, bonds, 
pensions, and an assortment of rights granted by the activist welfare state.”100 
Scholars, even those from originalist camps, have since found reasons for why 
Pennsylvania Coal fits squarely within the Framers’ intent for the Takings 
Clause.101  
All that modern scholars can truly agree upon is that the takings 
jurisprudence, especially in the context of regulatory takings, is incoherent.102 
At least one scholar even interprets Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lucas “to be 
treating the Takings Clause as capable of evolution, without making a case for 
why it should be so treated.”103 In the context of patent rights, scholars Bell and 
Parchomovsky described property in a manner that leaves room for patents: 
“Property’s usage of the concept of ‘thing’ is capacious, including not just 
tangible items but also ideas and qualities. Accordingly, intangible goods such 
as ideas, expressions, or symbols may be proper subjects of property law.”104  
While patents embody the ultimate intangible property right, it is not 
something that can be physically invaded, the right is not appurtenant, and 
ending the right through governmental action does not diminish the value 
sufficiently to effectuate a taking. Therefore, intellectual property law, 
specifically patent law, does not fit within any of the existing Takings Clause 
categories created in Loretto, Lucas, or Penn Central. Instead of continuing to 
use originalism as a pretext for the evolution of the doctrine, the Court should 
once again expand the takings doctrine to include a fourth type of 
unconstitutional regulatory taking using a living constitutionalist interpretative 
method. 
The Federal Circuit in Celgene appears to have attempted exactly this 
expansion. However, the court did the Takings Clause no favors. A reading of 
the opinion has a “because I said so” attitude underlying the text. The Federal 
Circuit basing the living constitutionalism viewpoint on the notice afforded to 
the patent owner makes sense, but the Federal Circuit did not give enough detail 
 
 98 Treanor, supra note 92, at 798 (discussing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922)).  
 99 Id. at 803–06, 811. 
 100 Id. at 812 (quoting BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 166 (1977)).  
 101 See, e.g., id. at 815. 
 102 See Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Takings 
Jurisprudence, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 899, 899 (first citing Carol M. Rose, Mahon 
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984); 
and then citing Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964)).  
 103 Treanor, supra note 92, at 807–08. 
 104 Eagle, supra note 102, at 933 (quoting Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A 
Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 577 (2005)). 
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about the pre-AIA evaluation system and the IPR evaluation system of the AIA 
to be truly persuasive in its reasoning.  
Living constitutionalism is an abandonment of the originalist theories of 
fixation and constraint.105 A plethora of interpretative methods exist under the 
vast umbrella of living constitutionalism.106 Dworkin and Fleming’s moral 
readings theory,107 Strauss’s common law constitutionalism theory,108 and 
Ackerman’s popular constitutionalism theory109 are each particularly relevant 
interpretative methods.110 Each theory has supporters and critics, but each 
theory is running towards the same objective: doctrinal evolution based on 
various elements of temporal and societal changes.111 The idea is that, instead 
of forcing an ill-fitting originalist doctrine to contemporary legal issues, the 
judiciary should embrace a forward-looking perspective to ensure that 
constitutional doctrine, like the Takings Clause, does not become a 
discombobulated, incoherent, and complex set of legal rules.  
Patent law exemplifies the need to bring the Takings Clause into the twenty-
first century using theories of living constitutionalism. There is no dispute that 
the Framers intended for the Takings Clause to apply to physical property.112 
Furthermore, the Intellectual Property Clause in the Constitution existed prior 
to passage of the Fifth Amendment. Viewing the Constitution as a whole,113 if 
Congress intended for intellectual property to be subject to the Takings Clause, 
it would be expected that historical records would say as much. The fact of the 
matter is, historical records detailing the Framers’ intentions contain gaps, 
which supports a more progressive view of the takings doctrine.  
This brings us back to where we started: the Federal Circuit. The Federal 
Circuit is a progressive court that attempts to apply progressive takings clause 
doctrine. These efforts conform with the intent of the creation of the court in a 
time when it was known that the balance between private and governmental 
interests clashed:  
 
 105 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The 
Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1271 (2019). 
 106 Id.  
 107 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 2 (1996); BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 86, at 26.  
 108 See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).  
 109 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 51–62 (1991). 
 110 Solum, supra note 105, at 1271–72.  
 111 See Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1319, 1327−37 (2008); Eliot T. Tracz, Doctrinal Evolution and the Living Constitution, 42 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 257, 258 (2017).  
 112 Treanor, supra note 92, at 795.  
 113 See Dodson, supra note 111, at 1341–42 (first citing CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., 
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); then citing JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77−101 (1980); and then 
citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192−94 (1987)).  
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[O]ur economic strength as a nation depends on technologic leadership, the 
balance of trade, and a culture that favors creativity, entrepreneurship, and 
industrial activity. These aspects can be fostered or deterred by governmental 
policy. The provision of an optimum policy of innovation incentive in a system 
of private enterprise is a complex question of industrial economics and 
scientific advance, a question whose answer varies among industries, markets, 
subject matter, and nations.114 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “is a court of commerce, 
industry, and governmental obligation, flowing from its many and varied areas 
of jurisdiction. The court’s concerns are with the nation’s business and trade, 
for both government and the private sector, and with the nation’s human 
obligations.”115 The Federal Circuit is an ideal Article III judicial body to 
expand the Takings Clause doctrine using progressive constitutional theories to 
incorporate patent law. However, due to the lack of discussion of the minutiae 
in regard to the differences among the AIA and its predecessors in Celgene v. 
Peter, the Federal Circuit should grant a rehearing en banc to elaborate on its 
reasoning and create a more robust progressive Takings Clause doctrine.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
The Takings Clause is a complex and disjointed doctrine that seems to gain 
complexity with each published case. Retroactive application of AIA inter 
partes review to invalidate patents issued prior to the passage of the AIA 
presents a special circumstance that is incongruent with the existing takings 
jurisprudence. The Takings Clause represents a conservative doctrine applied 
pretextually under originalist theories, but in this situation, a progressive living 
constitutional reasoning is warranted. The Federal Circuit is an appropriate 
venue for such a shake up, but more detail is needed to legitimize and create a 
fourth category of the regulatory Takings Clause doctrine.  
 
 114 Pauline Newman, Foreword: The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
821, 821–22 (2005). 
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